(1) Therefore.--The description just given of the state of one section of the human race contains implicitly the condemnation of the other; for it is equally applicable to both.
Wherein thou judgest another.--By the very act of sitting in judgment upon your fellow-man, you pass sentence upon yourself. You declare those acts to be criminal of which you are yourself guilty.
The words in the Greek, translated by "judge" and "condemn," are related to each other much the same as the summing up of a judge is related to his verdict. In the first, sentence is in process of being passed, but there is still a possibility of acquittal; in the second, sentence has been definitely given in a sense adverse to the accused. "Another," rather, strictly, the other, thy fellow, or neighbour.
Verses 1-29. - (b) Those who judge others, not excepting the Jews. Here a new stage of the argument, in proof of the position propounded in Romans 1:18, begins, and is continued to the end of the chapter. The position to be proved is that all mankind is guilty before God (see note on ver. 18). So far this has been shown with regard to the mass of the heathen world; its general moral corruption, prevalent and condoned, having been pointed out finally as a glaring proof; the main point of the argument having been to trace this state of things to man's own fault, in that he had refused to retain and act on a knowledge of God originally imparted to him through nature and through conscience. From such refusal had ensued idolatry; thence, as a judicial consequence, profligacy; thence a general prevalence of abominable practices; and at last (in many at least) the "reprobate mind," lost to moral restraint, and approving of vice as well as practising it. Thus it is sufficiently proved that the heathen world, regarded as a whole, is under sin, and liable to the wrath of God. But the required proof that the whole of mankind is guilty is not yet complete. It might be said that there are many still who disapprove of all this wickedness, and sit in judgment on it, and who are, therefore, not themselves implicated in the guilt. To such persons the apostle now turns, his purpose being to show that their judging others does not exempt themselves, unless they can show that they are themselves sinless. All, he argues, are tainted with sin, and therefore implicated in the guilt of the human race, while the very fact of their judging others condemns them all the more. It is usually said by commentators that, the sin of the heathen world having been established in the first chapter, the second has reference exclusively to the Jews. But this is surely not so. The expressions, ἄνθρωπε and πᾶς ὁ κρίνων (vers. 1, 3), seem evidently to include all who judge others; and it is not till ver. 9 that any distinction between Jew and Gentile comes in. Nor would the argument have been complete without refutation of Gentile as well as Jewish judgers of others. For the philosophical schools especially claimed superiority to the mass of mankind, and would be likely to resent their own inclusion in the general condemnation. Notably the Stoics, whose philosophy was at that time, as well as that of the Epicureans, extensively professed by educated Romans. Seneca was a contemporary of St. Paul. The Stoics might be suitably designated as οἱ κρίνοντες: for they affected to look down from a position of calm philosophical superiority on those who followed their mere natural impulses, professing to be themselves guided by right reason, and superior to the passions of ordinary humanity. It was a home-thrust at them to ask - Are you, who thus judge others, as exempt as you profess to be from the vices you condemn? If the accounts that have come down to us of Seneca's own life be true, he certainly was not a paragon of virtue. Now, be it observed that the sort of people now addressed are not concluded to be sunk into all the depths of sin spoken of above; their very affecting to judge others implies, at any rate, theoretic approval of the right. Nor does St. Paul anywhere suggest that there is no difference between man and man with regard to moral worth before God; nay, in this very chapter he forcibly declares the moral excellence of some, without the Law as well as with the Law, and eternal life as its reward (vers. 7, 10, 14, 15). All he implies of necessity is that none whatever are so exempt from sin as to be in a position to judge others; and it is the judgment of others that he here especially attacks, as increasing, rather than exempting from, condemnation. For it involves in itself the sin of presumption, unless those that judge are sinless. But it may be said that the universal sinfulness of mankind is still not proved. For
(1) it is not actually demonstrated that all of those who judge "do the same things." The answer to this objection is, that this does not admit of rigid proof, and that therefore the apostle deems it enough to appeal to the consciences of the judgers themselves as to how the matter stands with them. But it may be said
(2) that the sinfulness of such persons as are spoken of in vers. 7, 10, 14, 15, 29-such, namely, as sincerely strive after good without setting themselves up as judges - is still unproved. So it is in this chapter; and, for logical completeness, the proof must be taken as implied. It was, we may suppose in the writer's mind, and afterwards, in ch. 7, where the inner consciousness of even the best is analyzed, the missing link of the argument is supplied. Verses 1, 2. - Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou doest (rather, dost practise; the word is πράσσεις, see Romans 1:32) the same things. But we know that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit (or, practise, as before) such things. As has been observed above, the fact that πᾶς ὁ κρίνων "does the same things," is not proved; it is incapable of patent proof, and so the argument takes the form of an appeal to the consciences of such persons. "Porro quia ipsos interioris impuritatis insimulat, quae ut humanos oculos latet, redargui convincique nequeat humanis testimoniis, ad Dei judicium provocat, cui nec tenebrae ipsae sunt absconditae, et cujus sensu tangi peceatoribus, velint nolint, necesse est" (Calvin). On κατὰἀλήθειαν, in ver. 2, Calvin also remarks, "Veritas porro haec judicii in duobus consistit: quod sine personarum respectu delictum puniet, in quocunque deprehenderit homine; deinde quod externam speciem non moratur, nec opere ipso contentus est nisi a vera sinceri-tate animi prodeat."
2:1-16 The Jews thought themselves a holy people, entitled to their privileges by right, while they were unthankful, rebellious, and unrighteous. But all who act thus, of every nation, age, and description, must be reminded that the judgment of God will be according to their real character. The case is so plain, that we may appeal to the sinner's own thoughts. In every wilful sin, there is contempt of the goodness of God. And though the branches of man's disobedience are very various, all spring from the same root. But in true repentance, there must be hatred of former sinfulness, from a change wrought in the state of the mind, which disposes it to choose the good and to refuse the evil. It shows also a sense of inward wretchedness. Such is the great change wrought in repentance, it is conversion, and is needed by every human being. The ruin of sinners is their walking after a hard and impenitent heart. Their sinful doings are expressed by the strong words, treasuring up wrath. In the description of the just man, notice the full demand of the law. It demands that the motives shall be pure, and rejects all actions from earthly ambition or ends. In the description of the unrighteous, contention is held forth as the principle of all evil. The human will is in a state of enmity against God. Even Gentiles, who had not the written law, had that within, which directed them what to do by the light of nature. Conscience is a witness, and first or last will bear witness. As they nature. Conscience is a witness, and first or last will bear witness. As they kept or broke these natural laws and dictates, their consciences either acquitted or condemned them. Nothing speaks more terror to sinners, and more comfort to saints, than that Christ shall be the Judge. Secret services shall be rewarded, secret sins shall be then punished, and brought to light.
Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man,.... Some think, from the connection of these words with the preceding chapter, that the Gentiles are here meant; and particularly those among them who seemed to be virtuous, and took upon them to be the reprovers of others, and yet did the same things themselves, as Socrates, Cato, Seneca, and others; and therefore must be inexcusable, because they knew better, and would be thought to have been so; wherefore such could never be justified before God by their works, but might be justly condemned by him, nor shall they escape his righteous judgment. Others think the Jews are meant, who despised and condemned the Gentiles, and thought themselves to be righteous persons, and justified in the sight of God; and who, though they were secretly guilty of many abominable iniquities, yet were very severe upon the sins of others, and therefore inexcusable: others think that magistrates are designed, whether among Jews or Gentiles, who reprove and punish sin in others, and therefore must be supposed to know the law, and the nature of sin, and so are inexcusable and self-condemned when they do the same things; wherefore though they may pass with impunity among men, they shall not escape the judgment of God. Rather the words respect every man, of whatsoever nation, office, or place; and may be particularly applied to hypocrites, and seem designed to correct censoriousness, and hasty judging, and to throw confusion on such who value themselves on being the censurers and reprovers of others:
whosoever thou art that judgest; whether a Jew or a Gentile, a public magistrate or a private person:
for wherein thou judgest another; that is, in what case or instance; the Complutensian edition and the Arabic version read, "in" "or with what judgment thou judgest another"; See Gill on Matthew 7:2;
thou condemnest thyself; by judging them:
for thou that judgest dost the same things; art guilty of the same thing condemned in others, and therefore must be self-condemned.
Wherein thou judgest another.--By the very act of sitting in judgment upon your fellow-man, you pass sentence upon yourself. You declare those acts to be criminal of which you are yourself guilty.
The words in the Greek, translated by "judge" and "condemn," are related to each other much the same as the summing up of a judge is related to his verdict. In the first, sentence is in process of being passed, but there is still a possibility of acquittal; in the second, sentence has been definitely given in a sense adverse to the accused. "Another," rather, strictly, the other, thy fellow, or neighbour.
(1) it is not actually demonstrated that all of those who judge "do the same things." The answer to this objection is, that this does not admit of rigid proof, and that therefore the apostle deems it enough to appeal to the consciences of the judgers themselves as to how the matter stands with them. But it may be said
(2) that the sinfulness of such persons as are spoken of in vers. 7, 10, 14, 15, 29-such, namely, as sincerely strive after good without setting themselves up as judges - is still unproved. So it is in this chapter; and, for logical completeness, the proof must be taken as implied. It was, we may suppose in the writer's mind, and afterwards, in ch. 7, where the inner consciousness of even the best is analyzed, the missing link of the argument is supplied. Verses 1, 2. - Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou doest (rather, dost practise; the word is πράσσεις, see Romans 1:32) the same things. But we know that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit (or, practise, as before) such things. As has been observed above, the fact that πᾶς ὁ κρίνων "does the same things," is not proved; it is incapable of patent proof, and so the argument takes the form of an appeal to the consciences of such persons. "Porro quia ipsos interioris impuritatis insimulat, quae ut humanos oculos latet, redargui convincique nequeat humanis testimoniis, ad Dei judicium provocat, cui nec tenebrae ipsae sunt absconditae, et cujus sensu tangi peceatoribus, velint nolint, necesse est" (Calvin). On κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, in ver. 2, Calvin also remarks, "Veritas porro haec judicii in duobus consistit: quod sine personarum respectu delictum puniet, in quocunque deprehenderit homine; deinde quod externam speciem non moratur, nec opere ipso contentus est nisi a vera sinceri-tate animi prodeat."
whosoever thou art that judgest; whether a Jew or a Gentile, a public magistrate or a private person:
for wherein thou judgest another; that is, in what case or instance; the Complutensian edition and the Arabic version read, "in" "or with what judgment thou judgest another"; See Gill on Matthew 7:2;
thou condemnest thyself; by judging them:
for thou that judgest dost the same things; art guilty of the same thing condemned in others, and therefore must be self-condemned.